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Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution
In: European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 636/2019
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Working paper
Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism
In: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
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Activism and Takeovers
In: Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 15-04
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In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 3, S. 569-590
ISSN: 1944-7981
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets, and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms.
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Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law
In: Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 17-8
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The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15249
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What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts
In: EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings
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Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 32
ISSN: 1614-0559
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
In: Journal of political economy, Band 106, Heft 1, S. 172-204
ISSN: 1537-534X
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
In: Journal of political economy, Band 106, Heft 1, S. 172
ISSN: 0022-3808